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Abstract
In this paper I explore the causal effect of exposure to the UK government’s mailshot on vote
preference in the 2016 EU referendum. I find that exposure caused a drop in the probability of
voting leave by 3 percentage points. The effect was stronger in individuals who were exposed to
few other sources of referendum information. For instance, females and the risk averse were even
less likely to vote leave after exposure. The effect was also larger for Conservative party support-
ers who consumed many other sources of information. The evidence is consistent with voters
being liable to persuasion. On the mechanism, I show that exposed individuals experienced a
“persuasion-through-knowledge” effect, which changed beliefs on topics of contention.
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1 Introduction
There is an array of evidence that exposure to mass media can influence voting decisions and
therefore political outcomes. This is true across various outlets, for instance, newspapers (Gerber
et al., 2009; Gentzkow et al., 2011), biased news programs and television (DellaVigna and Kaplan,
2007; Enikolopov et al., 2011; Durante et al., 2017; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; Peisakhin and
Rozenas, 2018) and radio (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Adena et al., 2015). In
addition, there is evidence that the effects of exposure can vary across demographics (DellaVigna
et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Kearney and Levine, 2015), which is attributed to certain
groups being more susceptible to persuasion bias (Gerber et al., 2011; Barone et al., 2015; Galasso
and Nannicini, 2016).
In this paper I show that government mass media regarding the 2016 EU referendum influenced
voting behaviour. I exploit an individual’s exposure to the Government’s mailshot that was sent to
UK households before the referendum and I show that exposure, on average, lead to a drop in the
probability of voting leave by 3 percentage points. Britain voting to leave the European Union was
a seismic event in European politics. A clear majority of economists and the UK government had
warned that leaving the EU would depress the economy and create a lengthy period of uncertainty,
and the Government was keen to convey their stance to voters. The mailshot, in the form of a leaflet,
contained information on the benefits of EU membership and the reasons why the government
officially backed the “Remain” side. The leaflets were sent to all households before the referendum
day, but, either unintentionally or by chance, not every person was exposed to the mailshot. Hence,
this event offers a unique opportunity to isolate the impact of the leaflet on voting behaviour.
I employ both a matching and difference-in-differences approach, which allows me to address
endogeneity concerns caused by selection issues and to estimate the causal effect of exposure to
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the leaflet on voting preference. In order to strengthen the inferences of the results, I conduct a
number of placebo and robustness checks throughout the analysis. For the first part of the main
analysis, I use all available individuals and find that exposure to the leaflet leads to individuals
being about 3 percentage points more likely to vote to remain in the EU. This effect is economically
and statistically significant, and is robust to various specifications and placebo tests. In the second
part, to explore what is driving this effect, I identify a group of respondents that had a low degree
of exposure to other sources of referendum information but were exposed to the leaflet. Here, I
allow for a heterogeneous treatment effect across different fixed demographic groups. I show that
there is a much larger drop in the probability of voting leave for females, low income, the risk
averse and those who expressed a preference to vote leave prior to treatment date. Moreover,
when focusing on those individuals with a pre-existing Brexit preference, I find that the leaflet
was effective in changing their voting intention. I argue that a “persuasion-through-knowledge”
mechanism is a plausible explanation for this evidence, which allows certain groups to be more
affected than others. In fact, the evidence of heterogenous effects echoes, and is complementary to,
the work of Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), Barone et al. (2015), Martin and Yurukoglu (2017), Adena
et al. (2015) and Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018). Using the high exposure sample of individuals
who were exposed to multiple sources of information and the leaflet, I show that Conservative
partisans were also significantly impacted, by about 6.2 percentage points. This occurs due to the
visible splits in the Conservative party, thus party supporters took the leaflet as a signal from the
Conservative government to back a remain vote.
To explore the “persuasion-through-knowledge” mechanism by which the leaflet impacted vote
preference, I contribute new understanding on how this type of media changed political beliefs.
Evidence of this persuasive mechanism is unaddressed in the existing literature, with the exception
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of Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018). I isolate the mechanism by showing how individual beliefs on
information contained in the leaflet were altered to align with the arguments presented in the leaflet.
For example, the leaflet made the case that unemployment would be higher if the UK were to leave
the EU, and the results suggest that exposed individuals were more likely to believe that this would
indeed be the case. I confirm these as channels of impact, by showing that beliefs were only altered
for scenarios and information contained in the leaflet by conducting a number of placebo tests.
This research makes significant contributions to the literature in three distinct ways. First, it
shows that clear, objective and realistic information from the government can have a significant
impact on vote intention, and explore the possible explanations for why this effect exists. In this
manner, the findings sit somewhere between the previous contributions by Barone et al. (2015)
on the negative impact of digital TV on Berlusconi’s vote share, and by Gerber et al. (2011) on
the positive impact of campaign mail on the Democratic candidate for the 2006 attorney general
election in Kansas. Uniquely, in this research I diverge from the current mass media literature on
the television and radio mediums by showing that a government mailshot with objective information
can also be a persuasive strategy for changing political preferences in the context of a referendum.
Moreover, my identification strategy allows me to identify the specific effect given that I can pinpoint
exposure to the leaflet unlike in some of the previous media literature.
Second, the findings contribute to the work on inherent cognitive biases (DellaVigna and
Gentzkow, 2010; Choi et al., 2014; Galasso and Nannicini, 2016) and the heterogeneous effects
of media. In particular, this paper contributes further evidence that certain demographic groups
are heterogeneously affected due to the varying degrees of persuasion bias. The findings shed new
light on which groups are affected by persuasive media, and are directly supported by the findings
of, for example, Barone et al. (2015), Adena et al. (2015) and Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018).
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Third and finally, this research contributes to the quickly expanding literature on the determi-
nants of Brexit and the support for populist policies (see, e.g., Goodwin and Heath 2016b; Antonucci
et al. 2017; Los et al. 2017; Becker et al. 2017; Colantone and Stanig 2018). All current work has
focused on the characteristics of an individual, or the population itself, in determining their vote
preference. This is the first exploration into the impact of direct government intervention in a
quasi-natural experimental setting for the 2016 EU referendum.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on
the referendum and leaflet itself. Section 3 describes the data and identification strategy used in
the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the main findings and various robustness tests. Section
5 presents results regarding the mechanisms and section 6 concludes.
2 Background
On June 23rd 2016, UK citizens were offered the opportunity to vote in a referendum as to whether
the UK should “Remain a member of the European Union” or “Leave the European Union”.
The “Leave” side prevailed by 51.9% to 48.1%. Figure A1 present maps of vote shares by local
authority district.1 Since this time, there has been a vast amount of debate in the media and
amongst academics as to what drove the referendum result. Much of the empirical academic work
has focussed on drivers at the regional-level and only a small portion at the individual-level (see,
e.g., Langella and Manning 2016 for an overview of vote leave determinants). For instance, Goodwin
and Heath (2016b) show that support for leave closely mapped that of past support for UKIP, and
Antonucci et al. (2017) highlight the role of educational attainment. Los et al. (2017) provide
1The referendum count was made for 382 local authority districts, I exclude Northern Ireland, Gibraltar and the
Isles of Scilly.
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evidence that areas with a higher density of leave votes were areas that were relative beneficiaries
of EU funds. Similarly, Colantone and Stanig (2018) show that areas that were more exposed
to globalisation had a greater tendency to vote to leave. Becker et al. (2017) focus on the vote
break down at the counting areas (by local authority) and find evidence that key fundamentals of
the population were at the heart of the leave vote, rather than exposure to immigration or their
education profiles. Liberini et al. (2017) suggest that it was in fact dissatisfaction with one’s own
financial situation rather than general unhappiness that contributed to Brexit. Additionally, they
show that it was only the young that were substantially pro-remain. On the whole, the academic
work confirms much of the narratives in the media about “who voted for Brexit”.
Despite the growing scholarly focus on individual and regional determinants no other research
has been conducted into the impact of the government’s EU leaflet. It is of particular interest not
only because of the impact it may or may not have had on the final result, but the leaflet came
at significant cost to the UK taxpayer of £9.3 million. The leaflet, entitled “Why the Government
believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the UK”, was sent
to all UK households on Monday 11th to Wednesday 13th April 2016. The 16-page document
contained information on the benefits on EU membership and likely scenarios should Britain leave
the EU with a particular focus on jobs, the economy and security. Examples of the front and
back page of the leaflet are shown in Figure A2 and A3. Even at a glance, in no uncertain terms,
the leaflet makes the case for remaining a member of the EU. The back page in particular makes
clear the aforementioned three areas of focus, which the government believed would be better if
the UK remained a member of the EU. The leaflet was intended to make clear the Government’s
position and therefore persuade voters to back a remain vote by providing a fair assessment of EU
6
membership and likely scenarios should the UK vote to leave.2 This, however, is not the first leaflet
of it’s kind. In the 1975 EU referendum, Harold Wilson’s Labour government sent a pamphlet to
all UK households that made the case for remaining a member of the European Community, see
Figure A4.3 The pamphlet-backed “remain” side won with 67.2% of the vote, this apparent success
may have acted as a catalyst in prompting the Government into action to repeat the past.
The exploration of this particular type of media is a distinct divergence from the current mass
media literature which analyses the effects ideologically biased media consumption. However, in
accordance with evidence in the related literature, I would expect certain demographics that are
more likely to be affected by persuasion bias to change their voting behaviour to a greater extent,
as in, for example, Kearney and Levine (2015), Barone et al. (2015) and Durante et al. (2017).
This is expected as different groups will suffer to various degrees of inherent cognitive biases re-
garding decision making quality (Dohmen et al., 2010; Choi et al., 2014). There is also evidence
that supports the idea that persuasion bias is larger for voters than for, say, consumers of a product
(DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010).
3 Data and identification strategy
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Individual-level data
The empirical analysis in this paper draws on data from the British Election Study (BES) internet
panel survey. It is a nationally representative survey of individuals that contains extensive informa-
2The leaflet was independently assessed to contain largely factual and realistic content (Giles, 2016).
3A full transcript of the leaflet can be found here: http://www.harvard-digital.co.uk/euro/pamphlet.htm.
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tion on personal political preferences, identity and demographics. I focus on one particular wave,
wave 8 – a´ la Colantone and Stanig (2018). This wave was conducted between 6th May and 22nd
June 2016, prior to the 23rd June referendum and contains a total of 33,502 individuals.4
The main advantage of these data, particularly for this paper, is that wave 8 contains a variety
of questions relating to the EU referendum. More specifically, there are questions regarding voting
intention, exposure to referendum information and sets of questions aimed at measuring opinions
about the campaign and the EU as a whole. Moreover, the respondents can be linked to their
parliamentary constituency and EU referendum counting area, which allow controls for regional
factors.
In this wave, respondents are asked about their voting intention in the EU referendum. Respon-
dents are asked “If you do vote in the referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Union,
how do you think you will vote?” To create the primary dependent variable of voting intention, I
code a dummy variable 1 for respondents who replied “Leave the EU”, and 0 for those who reply
“Remain in the EU”. Those who responded “Don’t know” are removed from the sample.
Another unique feature of the dataset is that respondents are asked about their exposure to the
Government’s EU leaflet, which made the case for the government-backed remain campaign. The
relevant question reads as follows: “Have you received and read the UK Government’s leaflet ‘Why
the Government believes that voting to remain in the European Union is the best decision for the
UK’?” Those replying “Yes, I received and read it” are coded 1, whereas those who respond “Yes,
I received it but I haven’t read it” and “No, I haven’t received it” are coded as 0.5 This forms the
4Due to missing responses the number of analysed respondents is smaller than the full sample, which is a result
of the number of covariates used. Moreover, the missing responses to questions which create the sample of 6,123
individuals is not systematic, that is, there is no particular question or questions that exclude people from the sample.
Formatively, results do not change when models are re-estimated with survey weighting.
5Around 56% of the sample received and read the leaflet, 31% received but did not read it and 13% did not
receive it.
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primary explanatory variable in this paper. Given that the leaflet was received by households at
least 1 month before the survey was conducted, it is very unlikely that an individual would read
the leaflet after completing the survey.
I follow much of the previous literature on voting and partisanship in selecting the set of
individual-level control variables (Clarke et al., 2017; Aidt and Rauh, 2017; Liberini et al., 2017;
Colantone and Stanig, 2018) and use individual-level data of aggregates used by Langella and
Manning (2016) and Becker et al. (2017). I also include some other potentially relevant variables,
such as a dummy for whether the respondent has friends from the EU and whether they speak
another language other than English. To control for partisanship, I include a person’s vote from
the 2015 general election, which follows from the intuition that people who voted for Brexit typically
voted for the right-leaning parties in the 2015 general election.6 In order to capture this effect, I rank
parties based on their Euroscepticism. More specifically, they are ranked by the percent of negative
mentions of the European Union in that party’s 2015 general election manifesto, taken from the
Manifesto Project Database by Volkens et al. (2017).7 The variable is centered by normalization
(mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1). The non-normalized ranks are reported in Table A2. I also
include measures of the Big Five personality traits for each individual, this helps to further unpick
the “black-box” of factors that influenced a individual’s referendum vote. Given the importance
for these traits in determining partisan support (Bakker et al., 2015; Aidt and Rauh, 2017), it is
entirely plausible that persons of particular fixed personality traits favoured one side more than
the other in the referendum.89
6This is arguably better than using a persons party affiliation due to the small number of UKIP supporters.
7Here, alternative rankings were tested, such as: negative mentions of multiculturalism and internationalism. The
interpretation of a positive and significant effect is unchanged regardless of the information used to rank the parties.
8For a discussion of the extent to which the Big Five personality traits can be considered ‘fixed’, and therefore
exogenous, see Brown and Taylor (2014). If we are to assume they are indeed fixed throughout an individual’s adult
life, this coincides with their ability to participate in the referendum, as voters must have been over the age of 18.
9In Appendix C, I perform a machine learning procedure to select the covariates, the results are unaffected.
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3.1.2 Descriptive statistics
As a basic statistical point of motivation for this paper, I split the summary statistics by exposure
status in Table 1. It shows that exposed individuals are less likely to express a preference for a leave
vote compared to non-exposed people. Moreover, on average, people exposed to the leaflet are more
likely to be male, older and to hold a university degree than those non-exposed individuals; they are
also less likely to have children but more likely to be a home owner relative to individuals who were
not exposed to the leaflet; there is no difference across exposure status for the income groups. These
are in line with expectations as those with a degree are expected to be more interested in information
regarding the referendum, whereas those with children and who are employed are typically busier.
A balance test of these covariates is reported later when I introduce the identification strategy. The
leave-remain vote split is much closer to the actual result compared to other works on Brexit that
have used individual-level data, such as Liberini et al. (2017). Further analysis of who voted for
Brexit is conducted in Appendix B.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for selected variables
Full sample Exposed = 1 Exposed = 0
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Vote leave 0.496 0.500 0.488 0.500 0.507 0.500
Male 0.539 0.499 0.555 0.497 0.518 0.500
Age 55.911 14.140 58.126 13.495 53.140 14.438
Age2 / 100 33.260 14.901 35.608 14.573 30.322 14.787
Married 0.549 0.498 0.580 0.494 0.510 0.500
Widowed 0.044 0.206 0.050 0.219 0.037 0.188
Non-white 0.071 0.257 0.065 0.247 0.078 0.268
Employed 0.501 0.500 0.450 0.498 0.566 0.496
Kids01 0.198 0.399 0.176 0.381 0.225 0.418
Ln(household size) 0.720 0.472 0.712 0.455 0.730 0.491
Home owner 0.728 0.445 0.763 0.425 0.684 0.465
Degree – education 0.454 0.498 0.469 0.499 0.434 0.496
A-level – education 0.195 0.396 0.193 0.395 0.197 0.398
GCSE – education 0.265 0.441 0.258 0.438 0.272 0.445
Friends from the EU 0.506 0.500 0.530 0.499 0.476 0.500
None – education 0.087 0.282 0.080 0.271 0.097 0.296
Speaks another language 0.229 0.421 0.252 0.434 0.201 0.401
Partisan -0.069 1.014 -0.018 1.011 -0.132 1.014
Household income (Over £70k) 0.080 0.272 0.085 0.279 0.075 0.263
Household income (£40-70k) 0.217 0.412 0.219 0.414 0.214 0.410
Household income (£20-40k) 0.378 0.485 0.371 0.483 0.387 0.487
Household income (£0-20k) 0.325 0.468 0.324 0.468 0.325 0.469
Agreeableness 6.133 1.784 6.191 1.769 6.061 1.800
Conscientiousness 6.847 1.854 6.972 1.830 6.689 1.873
Extraversion 4.106 2.207 4.140 2.235 4.065 2.172
Neuroticism 3.612 2.219 3.470 2.211 3.790 2.217
Openness 5.526 1.745 5.553 1.722 5.492 1.773
Referendum interest 0.947 0.223 0.968 0.176 0.922 0.269
Pre-existing Brexit pref. 0.431 0.495 0.420 0.494 0.444 0.497
Observations 6,132 3,408 2,724
Notes: Exposed refers to the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a re-
main vote.
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Figure 1a and 1b present the spatial distribution of the share of respondents that received and
read (were exposed to) the leaflet, by local authority district. These are constructed using all
individuals in the BES, not the UK population. Darker shades represent local authorities that
contain a greater proportion of exposed people. As the leaflet was sent to all households, there is
no concern about the possible targeting of areas expected to be marginal or strong leave areas.10
The leaflet reached a wide and diverse audience across the UK,11 the mean value of exposure by
local authority is 52%, the largest and smallest proportions are 74% and 24%, respectively.
10In this instance, there was no targeted campaign because the referendum was decided by absolute majority based
on a national, rather than regional, vote. This is unlike a general election in the UK, which is conducted under a
majoritarian system, where marginal areas are targeted with political party leaflets to win parliamentary seats.
11The leaflet was sent to Northern Ireland households throughout the week commencing 9 May to avoid disruption
ahead of their local elections. All individuals in Northern Ireland are therefore removed from the sample.
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(a) England, Scotland and
Wales. (b) London only.
Figure 1: Spatial distribution of the share of exposed to total respondents per local authority
district (as a %).
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3.2 Identification strategy
This research question poses a difficult puzzle in identifying a causal effect of leaflet exposure. As
the leaflet was sent to all UK households there are no areas intentionally untreated nor a particular
discontinuity to exploit. The variation in treatment assignment comes from the selection into
treatment i.e. a persons decision to read the leaflet if they received it. Thus, in order to apply a
causal reading to the impact of exposure to the leaflet on voting behaviour, I implement a matching
strategy based on the observed characteristics that select an individual into treatment (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008). This relies on there being no selection into treatment and so the difference in means
of the exposed and control groups has a causal interpretation (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). This
strategy does not, however, deal with the possible bias that is a result of self-reporting exposure
status.
In order to match homogeneous individuals with one-another, I use the comprehensive set
of observed characteristics in Table 1 and I crucially include two extra matching covariates: an
individual’s pre-existing Brexit preference, which is captured by their voting intention from a
previous wave before treatment and an indicator variable of referendum interest.12 It is possible that
those who report themselves as interested in the referendum are more likely to select themselves into
the treatment. The pre-existing Brexit preference is included as a control to ensure that individuals
are matched to like-minded voters. This explicitly accounts for the fact that voters who are more
likely to vote remain are more likely to select into a pro-remain treatment. Both of these variables
are powerful predictors of treatment status.13 I employ 5 nearest-neighbour matching where the
12I match, with replacement (each control observation can serve as the counter-factual for more than one treated
observation), on the following set of variables: male, age, age2 / 100, married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01,
ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3
categories of household income, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, openness, a dummy for
pre-existing Brexit preference and a dummy for referendum interest.
13A concern is that there may be some unobserved characteristic correlated with treatment status and vote
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nearest neighbours are identified from their propensity scores, conditional on the full set of control
covariates. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression of the form:
Pr(Exposedi = 1 | Zi) = Φ (ψXi + δ Brexit pref + ζ ReferendumInteresti + ǫi) (1)
where Exposedi is the indicator of exposure status to the Government’s EU leaflet for individual
i; Zi is a function of all covariates that effect treatment status; Φ is the cumulative distribution
function of a standard normally distributed random variable; Xi is a vector of control variables
from Table 1; Brexit pref is the pre-exposure Brexit preference (whether the individual would
vote leave from a wave prior to treatment); ReferendumInteresti is a dummy for a respondent’s
interest in the referendum; and ǫi is the error term.
I also track a reduced number of individuals to a previous wave before the leaflet was sent out. I
can therefore use a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach to further strengthen my suppositions.
Exposure to the government’s EU leaflet should reduce an individuals probability of voting leave
by making the case for remaining in the EU because individuals will be persuaded by the informa-
tion provided, therefore internalizing the government’s remain position. I do not expect this effect
to be unambiguous. As the related literature has shown (Barone et al., 2015; Durante et al., 2017;
Peisakhin and Rozenas, 2018), to name but a few, certain demographics are more susceptible to
persuasion. This is entirely plausible in this scenario given that the Brexit literature has established
that there are ‘core’ leave and remain supporters. If this is indeed the case, one would expect a het-
erogeneous effect across the different population groups. I allow for this in the analysis that follows.
intention. To examine this I present placebo tests and assess the sensitivity of the matching approach. I also address
the importance of unobservables in Table A12.
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4 Results
4.1 The impact of the government’s EU leaflet on voting behaviour
In Table 2 I examine the effect of leaflet exposure on voting for Brexit. First, by using OLS in
columns (1) and (2), the coefficient is negative and statistically significant: being exposed to the
leaflet is associated with about a 1.8 percentage point decrease in probability of voting for Brexit.
In columns (3)-(6), I implement the propensity score matching strategy outlined above.14 The
coefficients report the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) for leaflet exposure. In column
(3) individuals are matched on their individual characteristics. In columns (4), (5) and (6) to impose
restrictions that the matched control observations must come from the same day of survey response,
same county as the treated individual, and then both same day and county. The point estimates are
precisely estimated, remain negative and highly statistically significant. The coefficients are now
larger in absolute magnitude, compared to the OLS estimates, which indicates that the matching
approach has been successful in reducing the endogeneity bias. Exposure to the leaflet reduces the
probability of voting for Brexit by about 3 percentage points.
Table A5 reports the covariate balance checks before and after matching. Column (1) reports
the mean for the treated group, column (2) reports the mean for individuals that have not been
treated, the control group. Column (4) reports the mean for the control group individuals that
have been matched at least once using the nearest neighbour matching procedure. The columns
of interest are (3) and (5), which report the p-values from formal t-tests of the differences in
means before and after matching, respectively. After matching, all covariates balance. Therefore,
14The corresponding propensity score estimations are shown in Table A4.
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I fail to reject the balancing hypothesis for all variables that enter the propensity score equation,
which confirms that the matching procedure has been successful in matching together homogeneous
individuals and reducing the covariate bias. Figure A6 and A7 provide a graphical illustration of
covariate balance before and after matching.
Thus far, the results establish that individuals became around 3 percentage points less likely to
vote for Brexit after being exposed to the leaflet. I can now proceed to focus on particular groups
of the population which may be driving this result.
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Table 2: The impact of the government’s EU leaflet on voting behaviour
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Exposed -0.016* -0.021** -0.030*** -0.024** -0.029*** -0.039***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No Yes No No Yes Yes
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a
person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a dummy
for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all
columns includes male, age, age2 / 100, married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home
owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of household in-
come, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment voting intention and
a dummy for interest in the referendum. Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and
Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1) and (2) report estimates from OLS regressions, variables omitted are the full
set of controls, pre-treatment voting intention and a dummy for interest in the referendum as well as country-
level and proximity to referendum date fixed effects in column (2). Columns (3)-(6) report the average treatment
effect on the treated using propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. In column (3) there is no fixed
effects. Column (4) and (5) includes county-level and referendum proximity fixed effects, respectively. In column
(6) the specification includes both county-level and proximity to referendum fixed effects. The propensity scores
are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05;
*** p < 0.01.
4.1.1 Placebo analysis
As a mean of testing the robustness of the results, I conduct a number of placebo tests. If the
documented effect on voting behaviour is due to the leaflet, I should observe no effect of exposure
to the leaflet on earlier political outcomes for the governing Conservative party or earlier incumbent
governments. Moreover, as the leaflet constituted a short term shock, one would not expect the
leaflet to affect voting intention in the months after the referendum.
In Table 3, columns (1), (2) and (3) I repeat the analysis but use whether a respondent voted
for the Conservative party in the 2005, 2010 or 2016 May local elections as the dependent variable,
respectively. I find no such evidence that there were any prior treatment effects driving the results,
even in the local elections which allow for examination of voting behaviour just a month before the
referendum. In column (4), I check whether there is an effect on an individual’s vote intention in
wave 10 of the BES, where individuals were surveyed in November and December 2016. Under the
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identifying assumption that exposure exclusively affected referendum voting behaviour, I find no
effect that exposed individuals were more likely to support remain in the months after the referen-
dum. The placebo tests suggests that the findings are in fact due to the leaflet acutely conveying
it’s pro-remain information.
Table 3: Placebo analysis
Con 2010 Con 2005 Con Local 2016 Post ref. vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposed -0.007 0.009 0.028 -0.017
(0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.014)
Observations 6,018 5,608 2,318 3,974
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a
remain vote. The matching strategy follows the baseline specification in Table 2 column
(3). Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008,
2016). Columns (1)-(4) report the average treatment effect on the treated using propen-
sity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from
a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
4.2 Low degree of exposure to other information sources
To further examine the factors which are driving this result, I restrict the sample to individuals who
had a low degree of exposure to other sources of referendum information. To be specific, individuals
are dropped from the sample who report themselves to have watched any of the 5 major televised
EU debates; have heard about the EU from television, newspaper, radio, the internet or talked
to other people; or have been contacted by referendum campaigners. This leaves a sample of 513
individuals.15
Table 4 shows the ATT of exposure to the Government’s EU leaflet on the likelihood of voting
leave. For the full low degree of exposure sample, column (1), the coefficient suggests that exposure
15The summary statistics and spatial distribution for this sample are shown in Table A3 and Figure A5a and A5b,
respectively. When comparing the summary statistics of the full and low exposure sample, the statistics show that
low exposure sample are made up of individuals of similar characteristics to the full sample and are located across
the UK.
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is negatively related to voting leave, although, the effect is statistically insignificant. In order to
test how the leaflet impacted demographics that are more or less susceptible to persuasion bias,
I split the sample across various groups to allow for a heterogeneous treatment effect. In column
(2), I find that females are 8.8 percentage points less likely to vote leave after exposure, whereas no
significant effect is found for males. This is consistent with the findings of Galasso and Nannicini
(2016), that females respond better than men to a campaign with positive rather than negative
message. Low income and the risk averse are also less likely to vote leave after exposure relative
to the control group at conventional significance levels, with the effects 11.4 and 10.2 percentage
points, respectively. As voting in favour of leaving the EU was widely perceived as a risky outcome,
perhaps it is not surprising that risk averse individuals were less likely to vote in favour of Brexit
once they received information from the government advising them not to. The estimates are
statistically significant and far larger than the effect for the whole sample in Table 2. The findings
here match with my priors that particular groups will be more affected by exposure due to a greater
susceptibility to persuasion bias, which is also consistent with much of the previous literature.
In columns (8) and (9) I explore how different partisan groups were affected. At this stage, I find
no increase in the likelihood of voting leave for either Conservative or Labour partisans following
exposure.
As a final investigation, I examine the effectiveness of the leaflet of changing voting intention
for individuals who have a pre-existing Brexit preference. This goes some way to deal with the
selection concerns as I only use individuals who reported that they would vote leave in pre-exposure
wave. If the leaflet was effective I should observe that these voters have a significant negative drop
in the probability of voting leave after reading the leaflet. The results are shown in column (11). I
find that after exposure, such individuals are 9.3 percentage points less likely to vote to leave the
20
EU than those who were not, which is significant at the 1% level. This is an interesting finding
given that the primary aim of the leaflet was to garner support for the remain side.
Overall, the above results confirm that there is a larger drop in the probability for voting for
Brexit amongst individuals that had a low degree of exposure to other sources of referendum infor-
mation and to the leaflet, and show that these people may be driving the previous result.16 This
is, again, consistent with the hypothesis put forward by Gerber et al. (2011) – that the effects of
the mailshot should be larger in a low information environment. I also confirm that the leaflet had
an especially salient effect on demographics that are more susceptible to a persuasion bias, which
is in accordance with the existing literature.
4.2.1 Difference-in-difference
To further support the matching strategy in applying a causal inference to the results, I now employ
a DiD approach. I identify a number of individuals in the low degree of exposure sample who also
completed wave 6 (pre-treatment) of the BES as well wave 8 (post-treatment), this however reduces
the total number of individuals (N = 430). I now estimate the following regression model:
V ote Leaveit = αi + β1Postt + β2Exposedi + β3(Postt · Exposedi) + ψXit + ǫit (2)
where t = 0, 1. V ote Leaveit denotes the outcome variable, whether individual i will vote to leave
at time t. The model includes individual fixed effects (αi), a vector of controls (Xit), which includes
pre-existing Brexit preference and referendum interest, and an error term (ǫit). Postt takes the
16In all columns covariate balancedness is achieved for all variables, thus homogeneous individuals have been
matched together and covariate bias reduced – these diagnostic results are available on request. The placebo tests
from the previous section are also passed, the results are in Table A6.
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Table 4: Low exposure sample and heterogenous effects of the government’s EU leaflet on voting behaviour
Gender Income group Risk aversion Partisan
Full isolated Female Male £0-20k > £20k Avoider Taker Con Lab Wave 6 Leavers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exposed -0.037 -0.088*** 0.072 -0.114*** 0.052 -0.102*** 0.063 0.005 -0.033 -0.093***
(0.038) (0.030) (0.047) (0.036) (0.046) (0.029) (0.058) (0.155) (0.064) (0.030)
Treated/control 173/340 98/203 75/137 81/146 92/194 94/183 79/157 42/58 60/94 84/167
Observations 513 301 212 227 286 277 236 100 154 251
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age, age2 / 100,
married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of household income,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment voting intention (excluded in column (10)) and a dummy for interest in the referendum. Standard errors
are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(10) report the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching, with 5
nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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value 1 for the post-treatment period and Exposedi takes the value 1 for all individuals who were
exposed, 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β3 which is the DiD estimate of the effect of
the leaflet on voting behaviour for the exposed. The models are estimated using a fixed effects
estimator to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity. I focus on separating individuals by
their inherent characteristics (risk aversion and gender) rather than attempt to split the sample by
characteristics that plausibly vary over time (partisanship and income). Given the imbalance of
certain variables between the treated and untreated groups, I also balance the sample using each
an individual’s propensity score from a probit regression and re-estimate equation 2 in a linear
probability model (LPM).
Table 5 reports the estimates from the DiD analysis. The point estimates from the fixed effects
specifications are similar to those from the matching approach. They show that females and the
risk averse are 11.1 and 9.6 percentage points less likely to vote to leave than the relevant control
group. In the balanced sample the DiD term again shows results qualitatively the same to those
produced in the matching approach.
On the whole, the difference-in-differences results confirm what has been shown previously.
That is, a negative and significant impact on the exposed group, which is a significantly larger
drop if an individual belongs to a demographic that is affected more by persuasion bias, on their
probability of voting leave.
4.3 High degree of exposure to other information sources
I can now take the analysis a step further and investigate whether individuals who were exposed
to other sources of information during the referendum campaign were impacted differently by the
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Table 5: DiD estimates of the effect of the government’s EU leaflet on voting behaviour
Fixed effects Balanced sample LPM
Full isolated Female Risk avoider Full isolated Female Risk avoider
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post × Exposed -0.036 -0.111** -0.096* -0.071 -0.132** -0.148**
(0.040) (0.055) (0.051) (0.061) (0.064) (0.073)
R2 0.016 0.036 0.054 0.672 0.812 0.821
Observations 860 502 472 668 386 368
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person
has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote. All regressions include the full set of controls from
Table 1, pre-treatment voting intention and a dummy for interest in the referendum. In columns (4) - (6) the regressions
also include government office region dummies. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote
to leave the EU. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual-level, are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01.
leaflet. Given that there was an array of media sources discussing the referendum during the
campaign this is an interesting exercise. I use the set of 5,619 individuals who were excluded from
the previous sections as these individuals were treated with multiple sources of information as well
as the leaflet. Explicitly, I keep individuals who have watched any of the televised debates, heard
about the EU from various sources or had been contacted by referendum campaigners, as well as
being exposed to the leaflet. I repeat the same matching approach as before for this “heavily”
treated sample.
The corresponding results are reported in Table 6. In column (1) the coefficient is now absolutely
smaller in size than the low exposure sample and statistically insignificant. In this sample, however,
the results suggest some effect for males. In the groups where a large or significant effect is found
in the low exposure sample, the coefficients are now severely demeaned or insignificant at the
conventional levels, with the exception of Conservative partisans. Why might this be? For at least
two decades there has been a rift between supporters of the Conservative party on the party’s stance
on the EU and this split was replicated in the referendum campaign.17 In this high exposure sample,
individuals will have seen various Conservative party members on either side of the referendum
17In contrast, all other major political parties ran a united campaign about how their supporters should vote. The
Labour Party (only 10 members backed leave), the Liberal Democrats, the Scottish National Party and the Green
party all supported remain. UKIP and the Democratic Unionist Party supported leave.
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debate. For instance, in the 5 major debates, there was a Conservative MP on both the remain
and leave side in every debate. Thus, exposed individuals will have interpreted the leaflet as a
signal from the Conservative Party, who were in government at the time and sanctioned the leaflet,
to vote to remain. They were, on average, 6.2 percentage points less likely to vote to leave after
exposure.
On the whole, this suggests that the impact of the leaflet was far less pronounced in respondents
who were exposed to other sources of information regarding the referendum. The affect is attenu-
ated because the information is lost in the sea of other prominent forms of media. The null-result
here goes some way to explain the ultimately marginal impact of the leaflet on the outcome of the
referendum as many individuals were not uniquely exposed to the leaflet as a source of referendum
information.
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Table 6: High exposure sample and heterogenous effects of the government’s EU leaflet on voting behaviour
Gender Income group Risk aversion Partisan
Full inverse Female Male £0-20k > £20k Avoider Taker Con Lab Wave 6 Leavers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Exposed -0.018 0.006 -0.059*** -0.000 -0.027** -0.024 -0.010 -0.062*** 0.003 -0.022**
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.011)
Treated/control 3,235/2,384 1,417/1,111 1,818/1,273 1,023/704 2,212/1,644 1,362/1,022 1,873/1,362 951/560 1,051/731 1,348/1,042
Observations 5,619 2,528 3,091 1,763 3,856 2,384 3,235 1,511 1,782 2,390
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age, age2 / 100,
married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of household income,
agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment voting intention (excluded in column (10)) and a dummy for interest in the referendum. Standard errors
are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(10) report the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching, with 5
nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
26
4.4 Robustness checks
I now perform a series of checks to further assess the robustness of the main findings. First, in the
full sample, I consider alternate matching strategies, including Epanechnikov kernel matching and a
fewer number of nearest neighbour matches. The results obtained from these alternate strategies, in
Table A7, support the findings from the previous section: exposure leads to a significant reduction
in the probability of voting to leave the EU.
Second, in the full sample, I alter the set of matching covariates. I systemically exclude certain
characteristics, such as income and personality traits, and allow various fixed effects to enter the
propensity score equation. The results remain the same – the exposed group, on average, became
significantly more likely to vote to remain than the control group. The results are shown in Table
A8.
Similarly, I repeat the systematic exclusion and inclusion of matching variables for the low
exposure sample, whilst allowing for heterogeneous treatment effects. I also introduce government
office region fixed effects in all estimations.18 The results are presented in Table A9. The results
here support that of the previous section: for individuals who were only exposed to the leaflet,
certain demographics who are more susceptible to persuasion bias, were even more likely to vote
to remain than the control group.
Fourth, I include calipers of varying sizes into the matching strategy in an attempt to improve
the quality of the matching. The corresponding results are shown in Table A10. Here, the results
remain qualitatively the same and a slightly larger coefficient is produced when the caliper is 0.005
and 0.001.
And fifthly, I repeat the analysis whilst removing individuals from Wales and Scotland, where
18There is no distinction between party supporters due to the small sample size, therefore being unable to locate
sufficient matches.
27
exposure is lower on average. I expect an unambiguous treatment effect regardless of the region
an individual is located in. I drop individuals from Scotland, then Wales and then both simultane-
ously. The results, presented in Table A11, remain the qualitatively the same.
5 Mechanisms
The results presented thus far establish that exposure to the Government’s EU leaflet reduced an
individual’s probability of voting leave in the 2016 EU referendum. The leaflet presented infor-
mation on key topics that were of concern to voters and this section assess how the leaflet altered
beliefs on each of these issues. I also conduct some falsification tests of these channels and consider
some alternative mechanisms.
5.1 The effect of the leaflet on perceptions of leave vote outcomes
I now explore the mechanism through which the leaflet could have influenced an exposed individual’s
referendum vote. To do so, I return to the full sample of individuals.19 By being exposed to the
leaflet it should have highlighted particular areas of contention which could be worse off if a leave
vote were to win. For instance, one area highlighted by the leaflet was job security, the word “job”
was used 8 times on 5 separate pages.20 The leaflet made the case that jobs would be protected
conditional on the remain side winning. By making minor changes to the econometric strategy,
I can examine these channels of impact by examining the differences in a person’s opinion on
unemployment if the UK were to leave the EU by their exposure status.21 The relevant question
19Estimates are produced where the answers to the survey questions are non-missing.
20The words “economy” and “economic” were used a total of 12 times, and “security” was used 5 times.
21Results remain qualitatively same when using an LPM or probit estimator.
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reads: “Do you think the following [unemployment] will be higher, lower, or about the same if the
UK leaves the European Union?” From this I create a variable coded 1 for respondents who believe
that unemployment will be “higher” or “much higher” if the UK were to leave and 0 otherwise.22
This is repeated for other key areas covered in the booklet: the general economic situation, security,
whether they believe the referendum to be final, their personal financial situation, UK workers
working conditions and world influence.
The results are reported in Table 7. Column (1) shows that those who were exposed to the
leaflet were, on average, 2.7 percentage points less likely to believe that the UK economy would
better off if the UK were to leave, relative to the unexposed control group and is significant at 5%
level. Analogous results are obtained to suggest that exposure results in individuals being more
likely to believe that there would be higher unemployment, column (2); the risk of terror would be
higher, column (3); the referendum is the final say on the EU, column (4); and UK workers would
not be better off, column (6). No effect is found for personal financial situation and the UK’s world
influence. For the former, this is plausibly due to the macro focus of the leaflet, with only minimal
mentions of the cost of living impacts of leaving the EU. And for the latter, it may be due to lack
of clarity in the leaflet about the UK’s role in the EU’s actions on the world stage, for example.
There is only a very brief mention about the EU’s role in the Iranian nuclear deal and tackling
climate change.
These results suggest that the leaflet was effective at conveying it’s persuasive message about
contentious issues on the referendum campaign trail. Voters idealized the government’s position on
certain scenarios and therefore became less likely to vote to leave. In essence, individuals experi-
ence a “persuasion-through-knowledge” effect. This is perhaps testament to the fair and objective
22The responses: “about the same/unchanged”, “lower” and “much lower”, are coded as 0.
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nature of the leaflets content.
5.2 Falsification tests and alternate mechanisms
The results of the previous subsection suggest that by reading government’s media on particular
areas of contention influenced a voter’s perceptions of likely scenarios should the leave side win the
referendum. To further support these results as channels of impact, I now consider some falsification
tests and alternate mechanisms. First, as a falsification test, I explore whether a reader’s views
of specific outcomes that were not addressed in the leaflet were affected. Second, whether readers
became more or less receptive to prompts from the government after exposure. And third, after
being exposed, readers may take favourable views of prominent leave campaigners as an act of
rebellion against the leaflet and the Government.
To investigate these hypotheses, I exploit additional questions in the BES. I estimate the specifi-
cations as in Table 7 but similarly change the outcome measure. The results are presented in Table
8. In columns (1)-(4) I show the falsification tests of the channels of impact. I regress whether a
person believes that: there will be more international trade if the UK leaves the EU; the EU would
be better off if Turkey were to join; the EU has undermined UK parliamentary sovereignty; and
immigration is increasing, on exposure status. All of which were extreme areas of discussion in the
televised debates and in the wider media during the campaign trail, however, –critical to the placebo
test assumption– no information on these topics were provided in the leaflet.23 As expected, there
is no systematic evidence of an effect. I now attempt to rule out alternate mechanisms. In column
(5) I test whether exposed individuals became more trusting in general and no significant effect
23In the survey, respondents were asked what is the most important issue in the referendum. About 20% of
individuals said the economy (in the leaflet) and another 20% said UK sovereignty (not in the leaflet).
30
Table 7: Exposure to the government’s leaflet and opinions of a leave vote outcome
Better UK Higher Higher risk Referendum Better personal UK workers Higher UK
economy unemployment of terror is final financial situation better off world influence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exposed -0.027** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038** 0.011 -0.020* 0.009
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.016) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011)
Treated/control 3,302/2,598 3,272/2,560 3,327/2,612 2,896/2,315 3,245/2,533 3,340/2,619 3,341/2,652
Observations 5,900 5,832 5,939 5,211 5,778 5,959 5,993
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments
leaflet backing a remain vote. The matching strategy follows the baseline specification in Table 2 column (3). The dependent variable in columns (1)-(7) is
a dummy for whether the respondent thinks that if the UK were to leave the EU: the UK economy will generally be better off, there will be higher unem-
ployment, the UK will be at a higher risk of terror, whether they believe the referendum is final, the respondents personal financial situation will generally be
better off, UK workers will be better off and the UK’s voice in the world would be larger. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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from exposure is found. In columns (6) and (7) I also find no evidence that individuals take more
favourable views of prominent leave campaigners, Boris Johnson or Michael Gove, after exposure.
These findings suggest that the government’s message was acutely conveyed to voters. The
transmission mechanism was through the information provided rather than altering voters sense of
trust or pushing them toward the leave campaign as an act of dissent. Importantly, I also show
that exposure did not affect voter’s opinions of scenarios not mentioned in the leaflet.
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Table 8: Placebo tests and alternate mechanisms of exposure to the government’s EU leaflet
More int. EU better EU undermined Immigration is Generally Like Boris Like Michael
trade if Turkey joined UK sovereignty increasing trusting Johnson [0-10] Gove [0-10]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exposed -0.009 0.004 0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.039 0.149*
(0.013) (0.005) (0.012) (0.012) (0.027) (0.082) (0.08)
Treated/control 3,270/2,566 3,125/2,439 3,363/2,678 3,357/2,639 864/711 3,374/2,664 3,177/2,410
Observations 5,836 5,564 6,041 5,996 1,575 6,038 5,587
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments
leaflet backing a remain vote. The matching strategy follows the baseline specification in Table 2 column (3). The dependent variable in all columns is a
dummy for whether the respondent believes the following: in column (1) it is whether a respondent believes that there will be more international trade if the
UK votes to leave. In column (2) it is whether the respondent believes the EU would be better off if Turkey were to join and (3) whether the EU has under-
mined UK sovereignty. In column (4) whether they believe that the level of immigration is increasing and in column (5) the dependent variable is whether
the respondent is generally trusting. And in columns (6) and (7) respondents rank on a scale of 0-10, where 10 is the most favourable view, how much they
like Boris Johnson and Michael Gove, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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6 Conclusions
While much research has been undertaken on mass media’s impact on political outcomes, the impact
on a single political event is largely unexplored. Moreover, much of the work on Brexit has been
focussed on individual or regional characteristics that drove the leave vote, this work is a distinct
aberration from this strand as I offer causal estimates from a quasi-natural experiment around the
time of the 2016 EU referendum.
This paper has addressed the role of the UK Government’s mailshot to households on the 2016
EU referendum. I find that those individuals who were exposed to the leaflet displayed a higher
probability of voting to remain in the EU than the untreated control group. The effect is econom-
ically significant, about 3 percentage points, and statistically robust across different specifications.
When exploring the groups that are driving this result, I find that the individuals who were exposed
to other referendum information to a low degree and exposed to the leaflet displayed a much lower
probability of voting leave. Those with demographics that make them susceptible to persuasion bias
were affected to a larger extent, which is consistent with the literature by DellaVigna et al. (2014),
Barone et al. (2015), Galasso and Nannicini (2016) and Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018). Specifically,
I find that the effect is larger in absolute terms for females, low income and the risk averse. I also
show that the leaflet was indeed effective at changing individuals voting intention using data from
prior to exposure. I present evidence that, in the midst of Conservative party in-fighting over the
party’s position, exposed Conservative supporters were more likely to vote remain as they took
the leaflet as a signal from the Conservative Government. Moreover, the lack of a result for the
individuals that were exposed to multiple sources of information shows that these other sources,
such as the debates, attenuated the leaflet’s impact.
In terms of the mechanism at work, I provide evidence for a “persuasion-through-knowledge”
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effect. That is, the leaflet was effective at conveying the likely scenarios of a leave vote and
highlighting the benefits of EU membership, which persuaded voters into voting to remain in the
EU. This is because of the realistic, objective nature of the information provided. This is also
consistent with the idea that the media altered individual political beliefs about key referendum
topics. I also reject alternate mechanisms and can hence be confident that the channel of impact
was through leaflet exposure.
Whilst this research is specific to the referendum, my analysis provides more general insights
into the economic allocation of scarce public resources and strategies for political campaigning
based on persuasion bias. In a possible second EU referendum, a more targeted campaign, for
example, based on reaching specifically those demographics who were more likely to believe the
information and change their voting behaviour accordingly may be more fruitful. Nonetheless, the
results suggest that the objective information contained in the leaflet was effective. As this paper
considers only a single source of referendum information, there are several possible areas for future
research. The sheer number of sources of information on the referendum may prove to be an inter-
esting area to explore. The televised debates, the murder of Jo Cox MP or the role of a declining
industrial sector all warrant further exploration. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) consider ‘fake news’
in the context of the 2016 US election. Here, there are obvious parallels to the EU referendum
where fake news was ingrained in the campaign trail.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A
(a) England, Scotland and
Wales. (b) London only.
Figure A1: Spatial distribution of the Leave share (in %) across local authority districts in the
2016 EU referendum.
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Figure A2: Example front cover of the government’s 2016 EU leaflet.
Figure A3: Example back page of the government’s 2016 EU leaflet
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Figure A4: Example front and back page of the government’s 1975 EU
pamphlet
Table A1: 2016 Timeline
8th May 2015  BES wave 6 begins
26th May 2015  BES wave 6 ends
11-13th April  Government’s EU leaflet is
sent out to all UK households
14th April  BES wave 7 begins
4th May  BES wave 7 ends
5th May  Local elections
6th May  BES wave 8 begins
4th June  BES wave 9 begins
9th June  Postal vote registration ends
22nd June  BES wave 8 ends
23rd June  Referendum day
4th July  BES wave 9 ends
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Table A2: Partisan ranking
% of negative
Party name EU mentions Coding
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 16.53 8
Conservative Party 4.594 7
Liberal Democrats 0.782 6
Other – 5
Green Party of England and Wales 0.403 4
Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales) 0.387 3
Scottish Nationalist Party 0.112 2
Labour Party 0.099 1
Notes: The table shows the percent of the corresponding party’s 2015 general election
manifesto dedicated to negative mentions of the European Union, taken from the vari-
able per110 as coded in the Manifesto Project Database by Volkens et al. (2017). Other,
refers to all other parties that were voted for in the 2015 general election by respondents.
Table A3: Summary statistics for matching variables in isolated sample
Full sample Exposed = 1 Exposed = 0
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Vote leave 0.526 0.500 0.509 0.501 0.535 0.499
Male 0.413 0.493 0.434 0.497 0.403 0.491
Age 50.897 14.682 52.728 14.385 49.965 14.765
Age2 / 100 28.056 14.812 29.860 15.034 27.138 14.635
Married 0.470 0.500 0.480 0.501 0.465 0.499
Widowed 0.043 0.203 0.052 0.223 0.038 0.192
Non-white 0.074 0.262 0.069 0.255 0.076 0.266
Employed 0.579 0.494 0.555 0.498 0.591 0.492
Kids01 0.275 0.447 0.266 0.443 0.279 0.449
Ln(household size) 0.745 0.500 0.742 0.488 0.747 0.508
Home owner 0.614 0.487 0.659 0.475 0.591 0.492
Degree – education 0.292 0.455 0.306 0.462 0.285 0.452
A-level – education 0.230 0.421 0.225 0.419 0.232 0.423
GCSE – education 0.339 0.474 0.329 0.471 0.344 0.476
None – education 0.138 0.346 0.139 0.347 0.138 0.346
Friends from the EU 0.349 0.477 0.422 0.495 0.312 0.464
Speaks another language 0.127 0.333 0.127 0.334 0.126 0.333
Partisan -0.118 1.033 -0.065 1.034 -0.145 1.032
Household income (Over £70k) 0.053 0.224 0.029 0.168 0.065 0.246
Household income (£40-70k) 0.164 0.370 0.173 0.380 0.159 0.366
Household income (£20-40k) 0.341 0.475 0.329 0.471 0.347 0.477
Household income (£0-20k) 0.442 0.497 0.468 0.500 0.429 0.496
Agreeableness 6.150 1.812 6.064 1.709 6.194 1.863
Conscientiousness 6.741 1.819 6.832 1.795 6.694 1.832
Extraversion 4.117 2.129 4.121 2.189 4.115 2.101
Neuroticism 3.862 2.170 3.746 2.168 3.921 2.172
Openness 5.327 1.678 5.306 1.594 5.338 1.721
Referendum interest 0.823 0.382 0.879 0.328 0.794 0.405
Pre-existing Brexit pref. 0.489 0.500 0.486 0.501 0.491 0.501
Observations 513 173 340
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(a) England, Scotland and
Wales. (b) London only.
Figure A5: Spatial distribution of the low exposure sample, the number of respondents by local
authority district
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Table A4: Propensity score estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male 0.078** 0.091*** 0.076** 0.089**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Age 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Age2 / 100 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married 0.028 0.036 0.021 0.030
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Widowed 0.055 0.068 0.043 0.056
(0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Non-white -0.072 -0.059 -0.064 -0.052
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Employed -0.151*** -0.157*** -0.158*** -0.163***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Kids01 -0.062 -0.074 -0.053 -0.066
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053)
Ln(household size) 0.086* 0.069 0.083* 0.066
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Home owner 0.080* 0.085** 0.092** 0.098**
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Degree – education 0.288*** 0.306*** 0.279*** 0.298***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
A-level – education 0.236*** 0.258*** 0.237*** 0.260***
(0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.071)
GCSE – education 0.171*** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.175***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066)
Friends from the EU 0.086** 0.089** 0.089** 0.091**
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Speaks another language 0.078* 0.077* 0.081* 0.079*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Partisan 0.069*** 0.032* 0.075*** 0.037*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
Household income (Over £70k) -0.031 -0.011 -0.035 -0.017
(0.074) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077)
Household income (£40-70k) -0.032 -0.017 -0.032 -0.017
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056)
Household income (£20-40k) -0.072* -0.063 -0.079* -0.070
(0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.044)
Agreeableness 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Conscientiousness 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Extraversion 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Neuroticism -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Openness 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Referendum interest 0.503*** 0.490*** 0.501*** 0.487***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077)
Pre-existing Brexit pref. -0.144*** -0.157*** -0.155*** -0.170***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No Yes Yes
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Coefficients reported show the average marginal effect from a probit regression. Exposed
is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person
has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote. Columns (1) - (4) correspond
to Table 2 columns (3) - (6).
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Table A5: Covariate balancedness
Before matching After matching
Treatment Control p-value Control p-value
group group difference group difference
mean mean in means means in means
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Matching covariates
Male 0.555 0.518 0.003 0.563 0.526
Age 58.126 53.140 0.000 58.108 0.955
Age2 / 100 35.608 30.322 0.000 35.600 0.983
Married 0.580 0.510 0.000 0.582 0.840
Widowed 0.050 0.037 0.009 0.050 0.947
Non-white 0.065 0.078 0.060 0.069 0.536
Employed 0.450 0.566 0.000 0.450 0.992
Kids01 0.176 0.225 0.000 0.174 0.828
Ln(household size) 0.712 0.730 0.121 0.718 0.586
Home owner 0.763 0.684 0.000 0.760 0.772
Degree – education 0.469 0.434 0.005 0.468 0.892
A-level – education 0.193 0.197 0.669 0.191 0.820
GCSE – education 0.258 0.272 0.211 0.262 0.724
Friends from the EU 0.530 0.476 0.000 0.536 0.645
Speaks another language 0.252 0.201 0.000 0.257 0.668
Partisan -0.018 -0.132 0.000 -0.017 0.971
Household income (Over £70k) 0.085 0.075 0.130 0.085 0.979
Household income (£40-70k) 0.219 0.214 0.582 0.223 0.718
Household income (£20-40k) 0.371 0.387 0.226 0.366 0.648
Agreeableness 6.191 6.061 0.005 6.167 0.569
Conscientiousness 6.972 6.689 0.000 6.957 0.723
Extraversion 4.140 4.065 0.186 4.112 0.600
Neuroticism 3.470 3.790 0.000 3.457 0.811
Openness 5.553 5.492 0.171 5.552 0.974
Referendum interest 0.968 0.922 0.000 0.922 0.764
Pre-existing Brexit pref. 0.420 0.444 0.063 0.425 0.663
Observations 3,408 2,724 2,724
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Figure A6: Bias before and after propensity score matching – Table 2
column (3).
Figure A7: Bias before and after propensity score matching, with county
and referendum proximity fixed effects – Table 2 column (6).
46
Table A6: Placebo analysis: low exposure sample
Con 2010 Con 2005 Con Local Post ref. vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposed -0.023 0.041 -0.005 -0.043
(0.039) (0.039) (0.052) (0.041)
Observations 494 448 190 361
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet back-
ing a remain vote. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns
includes male, age, age2 / 100, married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01,
ln(household size), home owner, degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks
another language, partisan, 3 categories of household income, agreeableness, con-
scientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-treatment voting intention
and a dummy for interest in the referendum. Standard errors are Abadie-Imbens
robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(4) report
the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching, with
5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; ***
p < 0.01.
Table A7: Alternate matching strategies
Epanechnikov kernel Propensity score
50 reps 150 reps 4 neighbours 3 neighbours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposed -0.029** -0.029** -0.031*** -0.025**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that
is equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain
vote. The set of matching variables, with replacement, in all columns includes male, age,
age2 / 100, married, widowed, non-white, employed, kids01, ln(household size), home owner,
degree, a-level, gcse, friends from the EU, speaks another language, partisan, 3 categories of
household income, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extroversion, neuroticism, openness, pre-
treatment voting intention and a dummy for interest in the referendum. In column (1) and
(2) standard errors are bootstrapped using 50 and 150 replications, respectively. Columns (1)
and (2) report the average treatment effect on the treated using Epanechnikov kernal match-
ing. In column (3) and (4) standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie
and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (3) and (4) report the average treatment effect on the
treated using propensity score matching, with 4 and 3 nearest neighbours, respectively. The
propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A8: Full sample matching with alternate matching covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Exposed -0.023** -0.027** -0.021* -0.031***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel B
Exposed -0.023** -0.034*** -0.027** -0.034***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Panel C
Exposed -0.022* -0.028** -0.021* -0.039***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
County FEs? No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No Yes Yes
Treated/control 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724 3,408/2,724
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is
equal to one if a person has received and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Stan-
dard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns
(1)-(4) report the average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching, with
5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. The set of
matching variables, with replacement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 1, but ex-
clude the big 5 personality traits. In Panel B, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A,
but exclude the big 5 personality traits and whether the respondents has friends from the EU
and whether they speak another language. In Panel C, the matching covariates are the same as
Panel A, but exclude income dummies. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A9: Low exposure sample matching with alternate matching covariates
Gender Income group Risk aversion
Full isolated Female Male £0-20k > £20k Avoider Taker Wave 6 Leavers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A
Exposed -0.051 -0.102** 0.032 -0.049 0.024 -0.160*** 0.051 -0.093**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.094) (0.102) (0.050) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043)
Panel B
Exposed -0.068 -0.069* 0.027 -0.081*** 0.017 -0.119*** 0.084 -0.093**
(0.042) (0.036) (0.051) (0.023) (0.050) (0.036) (0.084) (0.043)
Panel C
Exposed -0.020 -0.088** 0.008 -0.084*** 0.041 -0.109*** 0.043 -0.088**
(0.041) (0.043) (0.105) (0.029) (0.043) (0.037) (0.067) (0.039)
Panel D
Exposed -0.018 -0.063 -0.013 -0.128* 0.030 -0.087*** 0.030 -0.090**
(0.039) (0.045) (0.028) (0.078) (0.042) (0.020) (0.066) (0.046)
GOR FEs? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treated/control 173/340 98/203 75/137 81/146 92/194 94/183 79/157 84/167
Observations 513 301 212 227 286 277 236 251
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the
governments leaflet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Standard
errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (1)-(8) report the average treatment effect on the
treated using propensity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a probit regression. The set of
matching variables, with replacement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 1 as well as government office region fixed effects. In Panel B,
the matching covariates are the same again, but exclude the big 5 personality traits and includes government office region fixed effects. In Panel
C, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A, but exclude the big 5 personality traits and whether the respondents speaks another language
or has friends the EU, and includes government office region fixed effects. In Panel D, the matching covariates are the same as Panel A, but now
exclude income dummies and include government office region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Table A10: Matching with calipers
(1) (2)
Panel A
Exposed -0.027* -0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
Treated/control 3,393/2,724 3,401/2,724
Observations 6,117 6,125
Panel B
Exposed -0.026* -0.041***
(0.015) (0.015)
Treated/control 3,363/2,724 3,399/2,724
Observations 6,087 6,123
County FEs? No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No Yes
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which
is an indicator variable that is equal to one if a person has re-
ceived and read the governments leaflet backing a remain vote.
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether an individ-
ual will vote to leave the EU. Columns (1) and (2) report the
average treatment effect on the treated using propensity score
matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores
are obtained from a probit regression. The set of matching
variables, with replacement, in all Panels, is the same as those
in Equation 1. Panel A finds matches using a caliper of 0.005
and Panel B finds matches using a caliper of 0.001. Robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table A11: Matching with countries excluded
(1) (2) (3)
Exposed -0.028** -0.026** -0.029**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Country dropped Scotland Wales Both
Treated/control 2,880/2,069 3,397/2,719 2,869/2,064
Observations 4,949 6,116 4,933
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an indicator
variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read the govern-
ments leaflet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable is a dummy for
whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Standard errors are Abadie-
Imbens robust standard errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns
(1)-(3) report the average treatment effect on the treated using propen-
sity score matching, with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are
obtained from a probit regression. The set of matching variables, with re-
placement, in Panel A is the same as those in Equation 1. Column (1) drops
individuals from Scotland, (2) removes individuals from Wales, and (3) re-
moves individuals from both Scotland and Wales. Robust standard errors
are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Selection on unobservables
With a matching strategy it is only possible to balance on observables that select an individual
into treatment, therefore it is plausible that there is some unobserved characteristic that drives
both exposure status and voting intention. To quantify the degree to which selection bias may
be affecting my results, I follow Altonji et al. (2005). Under the assumption that selection on
observables is equal to the selection on unobservables, this method produces the ratio of selection
on unobservables to observables that would be required to explain away the effect of leaflet exposure
on voting intention.
To implement this, I estimate OLS regressions using two sets of covariates. In the first regression,
I include only the treatment indicator, and in the second I use the full set of covariates. I then repeat
this exercise using the same two specifications but now include referendum proximity fixed effects.
I am testing how likely is a bias due to unobserved factors beyond the observed characteristics and
referendum proximity fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on the treatment indicator from the
two regressions are βˆfull and βˆlimited. Using these coefficients I compute the selection ratio (SR)
by
βˆfull
βˆlimited−βˆfull
.
I report the Altonji-Eder-Taber ratios in Table A12. The smallest ratio is 3.8 and the median
value is 4.8. The smallest ratio implies that selection on unobservables needs to be 3.8 times as
strong as the selection on observables to fully explain away the relationship between exposure and
vote intention.
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Table A12: Sensitivity to selection-on-unobservables
Controls in limited set Controls in full set SR
None All controls 4.3
Ref. proximity FEs Ref. proximity FEs + All controls 4.6
None All controls excluding income 5.95
Ref. proximity FEs Ref. proximity FEs + All controls excluding income 6.05
None All controls excluding the big 5 3.8
Ref. proximity FEs Ref. proximity FEs + All controls excluding the big 5 4.06
None Only core controls 5.09
Ref. proximity FEs Ref. proximity FEs + Only core controls 5.16
Notes: All controls refers to all controls in Equation 1. Core controls refers to all controls in Equation 1
but excludes the big 5 personality traits, whether ther respondents has friends from the EU and whether
they speak another language.
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Appendix B
Who voted for Brexit?
Here, I establish the individual characteristics that drove a person into voting in favour of Brexit.
This is a useful exercise for getting to grips with the data in terms of quality and representativeness.
Table B1 shows the results for LPM regressions testing the various determinants. Column (1)
reports a relatively parsimonious specification, which includes only basic demographics, education
and partisanship. Column (2) and (3) then introduce household income and the Big Five personality
traits, respectively. Columns (4), (5) and (6) progressively include an array of fixed effects to soak
up various degrees of unobserved heterogeneity. In column (4) I include local authority fixed effects
to control for local authority characteristics, this was also the aggregation at which the referendum
votes were counted at. 11 local authorities of the 379 are dropped as they contain no respondents in
this sample. Column (5) includes county fixed effects to soak up more regional trends, for instance,
Scotland’s overwhelming preference for remain, 39 counties are included. Column (6) introduced
proximity to referendum date fixed effects, this a dummy for the day the respondent completed the
survey. The inclusion of these dummies is in order to capture one-off day-to-day events that would
influence ones vote preference. For example, the murder of pro-remain MP, Jo Cox, on the June
16th caused referendum campaigning to be suspended.2425 Casting an eye across these 6 columns
it appears that regardless of the fixed effects included the point estimates remain qualitatively
the same. The elderly are more likely to vote leave, although this is at a decreasing rate. The
average turning point, across columns (1)-(7) is estimated to be about 59 years old. This is in line
with the findings of Liberini et al. (2017), who argue that it was only the very young that were
24Details on the murder in context of the referendum are provided here: https:/www.theguardian.com/politics/
2017/may/21/jo-cox-uk-general-election-campaign-pause.
25Results remain the same when removing individuals who responded after 16th June.
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substantially pro-remain. More educated people are associated with a lower likelihood of voting
leave, relative to those with no formal academic qualifications, highlighting the educational gap in
voting preference. Those with a degree are, on average, about 26 percentage points less likely to
vote leave than those with no formal qualifications.26 Home owners are also less likely to report
that they would vote leave. For those individuals with a household income of over £70,000 per
annum, they are about 14 percentage points more likely to vote to remain than those with a yearly
income of 0-£20,000, holding everything else constant. Conversely, those who voted for relatively
more eurosceptic parties in the previous general election are associated with a higher probability
of voting leave. Briefly, in terms of the Big Five personality traits, the direction of the effects
are in accordance with the prior expectations. Those individuals who are more conscientious or
extroverted are, on average, more likely to favour a leave vote. Whereas some weak evidence is
found for those who are more agreeable and more open are less likely to vote to leave. No significant
effect is found for neuroticism.
The results presented here confirm the media tropes about “who voted for Brexit” and are
consistent with what has been shown the existing literature.
26This is close to the estimate by Goodwin and Heath (2016a), who estimate an effect of 30 percentage points.
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Table B1: Who voted for Brexit?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Male -0.021* -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Age 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age2 / 100 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Married -0.010 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Widowed 0.031 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.035 0.030 0.030
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
Non-white 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Employed -0.034** -0.015 -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 -0.011 -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Kids01 0.011 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(household size) 0.033** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Home owner -0.061*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.051*** -0.043*** -0.050*** -0.042***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Degree – education -0.291*** -0.261*** -0.257*** -0.248*** -0.253*** -0.248*** -0.252***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
A-level – education -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.145*** -0.142*** -0.142*** -0.141*** -0.141***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
GCSE – education -0.037* -0.029 -0.028 -0.031 -0.028 -0.028 -0.025
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Friends from the EU -0.055*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.039***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Speaks another language -0.033** -0.029** -0.029** -0.028* -0.029** -0.028* -0.028*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Partisan 0.174*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.174*** 0.175*** 0.174***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Household income (Over £70k) -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.143*** -0.144***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Household income (£40-70k) -0.108*** -0.111*** -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.101***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Household income (£20-40k) -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Agreeableness -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Conscientiousness 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Extraversion 0.005** 0.005* 0.005** 0.005* 0.005**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Neuroticism 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Openness -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.259*** 0.178** 0.319*** 0.152 0.289***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.081) (0.089) (0.092) (0.108) (0.107)
Local authority FEs? No No No Yes No Yes No
County FEs? No No No No Yes No Yes
Ref. proximity FEs? No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.249 0.255 0.257 0.309 0.267 0.314 0.273
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Reported coefficients are from LPM regressions. The dependent variable in all columns is whether an individual will vote leave. Local
authority districts are government areas at which the referendum count was reported. County areas are NUTS2 regions. Referendum prox-
imity fixed effects are time fixed effects for the day of survey completion. The omitted category for income is households that earn less than
£20k per year. The education variables refer to the respondents highest level of qualification, the omitted category is no formal qualifications.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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Appendix C
Matching covariate selection
The variables selected as control variables all have some relevance to the dependent variable of vote
preference. They were selected based on an initial “eye test”, that is, were mentioned in the media
or in the academic literature with respect to the overall referendum result. The inclusion of the
pre-existing Brexit preference and referendum interest are selected as supplementary determinants
of treatment status. Whilst it is common in the literature to saturate the matching equation
with a large number of relevant characteristics, this may inflate the variance of the estimated
probabilities. Thus, in order to optimize the bias-variance trade-off I implement a simple machine
learning method to select the variables that enter the matching equation. This best subset selection
(BSS) method is performed using the gvselect command in Stata. It estimates regressions using
all possible combinations of control variables and reports the statistically optimal model, which
minimizes Akaike’s information criterion.
The BSS method reports that the optimal model is one that controls for partisanship, having
a degree or above, highest level of education is A-levels, age, the three bands of income, having
friends from the EU, the natural log of household size, pre-existing Brexit preference and a dummy
for referendum interest. The OLS and matching models are re-estimated using these controls and
the results are reported in Table C1. In column (1) and (2) I repeat the OLS estimation using the
BSS controls, column (2) also includes date and county fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) show
the coefficient for leaflet exposure from the matching procedure using the BSS controls, column (4)
also includes date and county fixed effects. Reassuringly, the coefficient estimates remain in line
with the previous findings of the models with a more exhaustive set of covariates.
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Table C1: Best subset selection
OLS Matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exposed -0.015* -0.021** -0.024** -0.030***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 6,132 6,132 6,132 6,132
Notes: Exposed is the Government EU leaflet dummy, which is an in-
dicator variable that is equal to one if a person has received and read
the governments leaflet backing a remain vote. The dependent variable
is a dummy for whether an individual will vote to leave the EU. Odd
numbered columns include only the BSS control variables, even num-
bered columns also include referendum proximity and country fixed ef-
fects. Columns (1) and (2) reports coefficients from a LPM regression. In
columns (3) and (4) standard errors are Abadie-Imbens robust standard
errors (Abadie and Imbens, 2008, 2016). Columns (3)-(4) report the av-
erage treatment effect on the treated using propensity score matching,
with 5 nearest-neighbours. The propensity scores are obtained from a
probit regression. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses; *
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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